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3 INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of Michael Foots tenure as leader of the Labour Party is a troubled one. The 
historigraphy is dominated by acounts of political division inside the Labour Party, Foot’s 
determination to shift the party towards the extreme left, and Labour’s most devestating electoral 
deaft since the Second World War. Foot assumed the party leadership at a time when it was still 
trying to come to terms with the breakdown of the ‘post-war settlement’ in Britain, which had 
been built on the idea of a mixed economy and Keynesian budgetary techniques to help manage 
the economy.1 The biggest threat to the ‘post-war settlement’ had always been the problem of 
inflation, which had turned into ‘stagflation’ by the end of the 1970s. This problem was so 
troubling for British policy-makers that even Labour leader and Prime Minister James Callaghan 
seemed to abandon the economic means to sustain the ‘post-war settlement’. When he gave a 
speech at the 1976 Labour Party Conference, Callaghan told Labour delegates that after a period 
of rising unemployment and rising inflation, new measures would have to be found to arrest 
British economic decline:  
‘We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase 
employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you, in all candour, 
that the option no longer exists, and that insofar as it did exist, it only worked by injecting 
a bigger dose of inflation into the economy followed by higher levels of unemployment as 
the next step.’2 
Callaghan had now revealed a gaping hole in Labour policy, one that had not been seen since the 
1930s.3 It was argued that Keynesian economics could no longer manage a faltering British 
economy alone, which meant that the party would now have to revise its economic strategy. 
                                                          
1 Thompson, Noel, Political Economy and the Labour Party, UCL Press, London, 1996, pp. 197-
199. 
2 Newman, Michael, Socialism – A Very Short Introduction, University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 
121. 
3 Wickham-Jones, Mark, Economic Strategy and the Labour Party – Politics and Policy-Making, 
1970-1983, Macmillan Press, London, 1996, pp. 2-3. 
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Preassure quickly mounted against Callaghan’s leadership and Labour MPs and supporters began 
to question what type of economic policy the party should adopt. One of the key questions was 
whether Lavour should adopt a revised, social democratic model or a genuine socialist 
alternative, which the party as a whole had historically avoided.4 
It was at this stage in the party’s history that Labour argubly abandoned the Keynesian economic 
model that prioritized full employment in favor of curbing inflation in the belief this new model 
would both increase the competiveness of British industry and reduce unemployment. 
Government spending was reduced, because the rising cost of inflation now surpassed the threat 
of unemployment, but in doing so, Prime Minister Callaghan found it difficult to fund and 
implement the policies his Party had campagined for.5 Politically, this left the party in chaos 
because some sections of the Labour Party battled over what type of economic policy the party 
should adopt and what other type of leftist polticies the party should pursue. When Michael Foot 
assumed the leadership in 1980, the Labour Party was already becoming unmanageable and the 
contours of division were becoming evident both internally and externally, and it was in this 
context the party had to seek consensus on an economic strategy that could challenge the 
Conservative government. The left felt that the Callaghan government had not fulfilled its 
promises while in power, and therefore sought increased control of the party machinery in order 
to hold the Parliamentary Labour Party to account. Many people, and in particular those 
Labourites who thought of themselves as social democrats, felt that Labour was becoming 
increasingly left wing, and that it would return to its socialist roots, a prospect that many Labour 
MPs feared. In reality, those fears were somewhat misplaced, because the outcome was more in 
line with a revisionist social democratic tradition than a socialist one.6 Nevertheless, the reforms 
in the party meant that the established PLP coalition, dominated by revisionist MPs on the right, 
was compromised. Eventually, a small group of former Labour ministers and prominent party 
                                                          
4 Desai, Radhika, Intellectuals and Socialism – ‘Social Democrats’ and the Labour Party. 
Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1994, pp. 3-4. 
5 Shaw, Eric, Crisis and Transformation – The Labour Party since 1979, Routledge, London,  
1994, pp. 6-7. 
6 Crewe, Ivor & King, Anthony, SDP – The Birth, Life and Death of the Social Democratic 
Party, Oxford University Press, London, 1995, pp. 104-105. 
6 
 
figures broke away from the Labour Party and formed the centrist Social Democratic Party. But 
despite an overwhelming burst of support in the opinion polls, the SDP performed badly in the 
1983 general election. Labour remained the second largest party, but it had been left in a 
seriously weakened state.7  
As the Labour Party battled itself, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party won a second 
consequtive general eletion. Her unwavering convictions and flare for politics meant that she was 
able to command loyalty from her party and collegues, something that the Labour Party 
leadership failed to do in this period. Thatcher and her Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, embarked 
upon policies of privatisation and ‘monetarism’ to fight off inflation.  
Foot, on the other hand, who assumed the Labour Party leadership in 1908, was lauded as a 
traditional man of letters, an intellectual historian  who had preformed well as a minister in 
Callaghan’s government.8 As a writer and orator, Michael Foot excelled, but as party leader he 
struggled to mke an impact in the television age. His unkept style, his gentlemanly 
unwillingsness to lash out at Margaret Thatcher, and his general unease in front of the cameras 
were all seized upon by the media, which reinforced the view that he was unfit for the 
premiership.9 The apex of this campagin against him was reached when he wore a blue-green 
duffle coat to the Cenotaph on Rememebrance Day in 1981. Foot suffered almost national 
condemnation for being inappropriately dressed for what was a very formal occasion, and his 
jacket was described in the media as “the donkey-jacket.”10 Foot was now charged with keeping 
the party together. But procurring a consensus on policy proved to be an impossible task. 
                                                          
7 Hill, Richard, The Long Road Back – The Labour Party and Economic Strategy 1979-1997. 
Palgrave, London, 2001 , pp. 28-29. 
8 Morgan, Kenneth O., Michael Foot – A Life. Harper Perennial, London, 2008, pp. 221-223. 
9 Thorpe, Andrew, A History of the British Labour Party. Palgrave Macmillan, London, third 
edition, 2008, pp. 216-218. 
10 Jones, Mervyn, Michael Foot, Victor Gollancz, London, 1994pp. 476-477. 
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The turmoil was perfectly captured by Magraret Thatcher who told a press conference that  
‘There really is no alternative,’11 a zeitgeist-phrase if there ever was one. Monetarism was the 
way to solve stagflation in the eyes of the Conservatives, and the failure of the political left and 
the centre-left to form a coalition inside the Labour Party on a common economic outlook meant 
that there really was no other choice for voters. The 1980s quickly became a fierce ideological 
battleground, where the Labour Party fought for its very identity and survival.  
3.1 THE THESIS 
 
Historians, who have understandably focused on other periods of the party’s history when it was 
successful, have neglected the Labour Party of the early 1980s. This is especially true of the 
Attlee and Wilson governments, which did much to build and maintain the ‘post-war settlement’ 
respectively.12 Historians have not subjected Foot’s leadership to as much historical scrutiny 
because it was widely perceived at the time to have been a disaster for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, this thesis raises important questions about Labour in this period and adds to the 
relatively thin historiography on the subject. In doing so, it seeks to answer the following 
question: 
Why was the Labour Party unable to agree on a new economic policy before the 1983 general 
election?  
The thesis focuses on Labour support for a monetarist or Keynesian economy.13 Political and 
economic debate within the Labour Party centred mainly on public ownership, inflation, 
employment, industrial policy, trade unionism, and privatisation. It asks what alternatives the left 
had to an economic policy centred on monetarism. It discusses how unified the left was in its 
opposition to monetarism. Finally, it investigates in what ways the left tried to revise Keynesian 
economic models. Michael Foot, Dennis Healey, Tony Benn, Gerald Kaufmann, Roy Hattersley 
                                                          
11 Thatcher, Margaret (Jun. 25th, 1980): Press Conference for American correspondents in 
London. Thatcher Archive: COI transcript, accessed 4th May, 2014. 
12Thorpe, Andrew,  pp. 3-6. 
13 Wickham-Jones, pp. 26-28. 
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and the ‘Gang of Four’, Bill Rodgers, David Owen, Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins will be 
central figures in this thesis because they represent the various factions and ideological positions 
within the Labour Party. They are the natural focal points for investigating the expression of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with party policy at parliamentary level.  
This period in British history is riddled with divisions and defeats for Labour. For example, the 
SDP-split, a civil war between the left and the social democrats that remained inside the party 
frame, and for the most part a declining public image.14 While the events occurred in the 1980s 
for the most part, it is necessary to view the conflict of the 1980s as a consequence of the 
discontent of the political left in the late 1970s.  Furthermore, although the Social Democratic 
Party came into its own after 1981, and as such was arguably to be an external factor in the 
debate, it represented at the time a beacon for discontented Labour members who were closer to 
the social democratic outlook than they were to a more radical form of socialism. Therefore, they 
are included in this study in order to understand what differences of opinion that the parties 
fostered, and how the revisionist social democrats argued the case of remaining a part of a party 
increasingly dominated by the left, or leave to establish an independent social democratic party. 
Hence, a part of this study is devoted to the Social Democratic Party alternative, and how this 
contributed to the failure to produce a consensus strategy inside the Labour Party. How did the 
social democrats of both Labour and the breakaway SDP adopt new economic policies to remedy 
the gap left by abandoning Keynes and a policy for full employment? Why did prominent social 
democrats decide to remain within the Labour party? 
Lastly, it is necessary to examine the leadership of Michael Foot, and his efforts to procure this 
consensus. What measures did he implement to bring the different sides together, and what 
economic views did he hold personally in this period? Was his leadership an obstacle to building 
a consensus as has sometimes been claimed and was he really to blame for to the party’s general 
election defeat in 1983? 
However, the main question at the heart of this study is why was the Labour Party unable to 
agree on a new economic policy before the 1983 general election. To answer this, the secondary 
                                                          
14 Shaw, Eric, pp. 25-28. 
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questions of leadership and party unity are crucial. Both will help to illuminate why Labour 
failed to convince voters that the party had a credible economic policy in this period.   
3.2 STRUCTURE  
 
The thesis is divided into two parts, each focusing on the 1970s and 1980s respectively. This 
allows us to differentiate between Labour in government and Labour in opposition, which also 
included a shift of leadership from Callaghan to Foot. 
Part 1 discusses the emergence of Labour disagreement in the 1970s when the Callaghan 
government faced huge economic challenges, which culminated in the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 
1978-79.15 It discusses how the government was perceived to not be delivering on its election 
promises, which promised to maintain a policy of full employment. This provoked a reaction 
from the left, which ended the revisionist social democratic dominance of the party in the 
process. It explores the main economic arguments of both sides, and how they influenced party 
policy.  
Part 2 examines the continuing debate in opposition, after Labours electoral defeat in 1979. This 
includes the socialists’ response to the crisis and their alternative strategy for pursuing the 
traditional objectives of the Labour movement. It then discusses the main components of this 
strategy, and how it failed to appear as feasible and credible. It also discusses the case for a new 
vessel of social democracy and the continuation of a revisionist Labour movement. Therefore, it 
focuses in particular on the nature of the schism between the hard left and the social democratic 
wing of the party, and indicates that the schism was not only attributable to the organizational 
reforms of 1980 and 1981.  
Lastly, this chapter discusses the position of Michael Foot and Denis Healey, and how they 
positioned themselves in the economic debate, and how they worked to keep the party together.  
 
                                                          
15 Thorpe, Andrew, pp. 205-206. 
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3.3 NOTES ON SOURCES 
 
Andrew Thorpe, in his A History of the British Labour Party (2008) 16 points out that historians 
face a number of challenges when working on Labour Party history. There are significant 
fluctuations in Labour Party historiography, which are attributable to electoral and political 
fortune, the personal predilection of historians, and the availability of sources. There are 
primarily three variables in Labour Party historiography that have influenced my approach. 
Firstly, the tone of books written on the Labour Party generally set a tone that is indicative of its 
prospects, achievements or failures in a period. Books written on the topic of Tony Blair’s 
Labour Party tend to be jubilant and cheerfully optimistic, fuelled by three consecutive election 
victories and the cementing of Labour as a governing party. By contrast, books on Michael Foot, 
Neil Kinnock and John Smith, are often pessimistic. In other words, historians tend to illuminate 
Labour in a different light depending on the electoral successes or failures, and the time of 
authorship.. Much of the literature of the period bears titles expressing this tone, with titles such 
as “The End of British Labour” or “Decline of British Socialism”, all pontificating that the end 
of left-wing socialist policy in Britain began in this debate.17 Therefore, to some extent historians 
are guilty of misjudging Labour’s outlook in the early 1980s based on what followed. There is 
now a need to take a more impartial view of Foot’s leadership.  
The second variable is the political agenda of the politicians, historians and biographers who 
authored the sources, some who were political rivals and sought to discredit their opponents, or 
persuade supporters. There are also Labour historians who felt a need to cover up its left-wing 
past so that it could construct a more convincing narrative today based on reaching out to the 
centre of British politics and ‘middle England’.18  Historical discourses are always intrinsically 
scrutinised for any sign of partiality or sympathy on part of the author, and while objectivity in 
matters of value and ideology is difficult, it is a necessity when considering how one can 
                                                          
16 Thorpe, Andrew, pp. 3-6. 
17 Newman, Michael. pp. 121-128. 
18 Thorpe, Andrew, pp. 4-5. 
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accurately portray a historical entity and period. For instance, Hattersley and Kaufman’s critique 
of Michael Foot as a party leader was in context with their social democratic orientation, and as 
animosity and fear, they harboured against a left-dominated Labour. For this period, it is 
especially important since the devastating 1983 loss is often used as proving the necessity of the 
comprehensive organisational reforms the Labour Party undertook in the course of Kinnock’s 
and Smith’s leaderships, eventually resulting in a very different party in 1997, rebranded as New 
Labour by then-party leader Tony Blair.19 There is nothing wrong with this assumption per se; 
election defeat often serve as a catalyst for change, but it is nonetheless the revisionist view of 
party history, presuming that the reforms were necessary and a socialist Labour was not electable 
in the eyes of the electorate, something that the traditional left dispute.  
The third and last variable is the availability of sources, which has become significantly easier in 
the last few years due to the opening of the Party archives to researchers and several freedom of 
information acts.20 It is still the case though that the resources desired are not always available. 
As a period in British political history, the Labour side of 1970s and 1980s history is often 
overshadowed by the first Thatcher premiership, which is unsurprising, given its intermediate 
position between a Labour premiership that marked the beginning of discontent in the party, and 
extensive party reforms in the long opposition period that followed. Despite this limited selection 
of literature, I draw on a number of different secondary sources to support and underline my 
arguments and interpretations in this thesis.  
Since this is primarily a study of if intellectual debate about economic policy in this period, the 
most important sources are books, political statements, articles and general election manifestos. 
This means that much of this thesis is devoted to the utilization and analyses of primary sources. 
Politicians have authored these sources in an attempt to persuade the public, but since this is an 
examination of the debate rather than an evaluation of policy, these representations are balanced 
by rival response or critiques, and the analyses in the secondary literature. Other sources are used 
when needed.   
                                                          
19 Hill, Richard, pp. 197-198. 
20 Thorpe, Andrew, pp. 5-6. 
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The sources include original publications of the Labour Party from the period, with the most 
essential documents being the 1983 Labour Party Manifesto and other election manifestos, made 
available digitally and with the assistance of the People’s History Museum in Manchester. The 
analysis presented by the memoirs, diaries and biographies, such as Michael Foot’s own review 
of the election, in his “Another Heart and Other Pulses”21, are vital to understanding the 
components that contributed to party’s devastating loss, and how the failure of finding a common 
economic platform was conductive to electoral defeat.  
Together, these sources will highlight intellectual debate, and the correlation between the debate 
on economic policy and the party leadership; both how it influenced the public image, but also 
the extent of Michael Foot and Denis Healey’s efforts to unify the divided party. 
3.4 NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY 
 
Finally, when dealing with the great multitude of political thinkers and politicians that this thesis 
requires, one finds an inevitable multitude of descriptive terms that are used liberally and can be 
difficult to distinguish from each other. The secondary literature reflects this, and Noel 
Thompson uses the terms left-wing revisionism and liberal socialism22, Andrew Scott Crines 
speaks of the inside and outside parts of the party with reference to the parliamentary Labour 
party23, Wickham-Jones deploys revisionist left or right wing terminology24, while others restrict 
themselves to speak broadly of the left and right of the party.  
The only term, which seems accepted by most authors, is social democrat. Even that term, which 
should be readily available to use of any member of the Social Democratic Party, is difficult to 
use, as there were still people who identified with the social democratic tradition inside Labour.25 
                                                          
21 Foot, Michael, Another Hearth & Other Pulses – The Alternative to the Thatcher Society, 
Collins Publishing, London, 1984. 
22 Thompson, Noel, pp. x-xi. 
23 Crines, Andrew Scott.  Michael Foot and the Labour Leadership, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, London, 2011, pp. 4-6. 
24 Wickham-Jones, Mark, pp. 8-9. 
25 Desai, Radhika, pp. 3-4. 
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The authors also agree that the left wing of the party frequently identifies as socialists, although 
British socialism is a distinct strain from continental socialism, and they disagree whether this is 
a technically correct term.26 There is however, few terms that can be applied to those in between 
socialists and social democrats in the party.  
For the purpose of this thesis, distinguishing between ‘outside and inside’ as Crines does, would 
be inexpedient as it focuses entirely on the Parliamentary Labour Party, but the general term of 
Thompson, liberal socialist, can be used to fill the void between the two extremities. Overall, to 
avoid difficulty, this thesis will use the terms of left and right to signify the more general 
observations, and the terms of socialist and social democrat, whereas outside and inside social 
democrats refer to those who remained inside Labour or deflected outside to the SDP. The terms 
themselves are also generalisations, to be carefully used. Politicians might agree on some topics, 
while disagree on others while still sticking to the same tradition, or indeed be influenced heavily 
by external pressures such as electoral prospects to adjust and realign themselves politically.27 
Any assumption of unity within the groups must be with a pinch of salt, and serve as an indicator 
rather than a strict label. Therefore, the objectivised ‘Croslandite, Hollandite’ etc. will be 
deployed to denote adherence to a particular thinker’s principles.  
One term which all authors do agree on, however, is the use of ‘revisionism’ to explain the 
continuing process of revising the socialist tradition and strategy to new challenges as they arise 
over time.28 This also means we are dealing with a term with some degree of duality. One the 
one side, revisionism speaks broadly of the need for a pragmatic Labour movement that adjusts 
itself to the realities of the day while maintaining the traditional objectives of equality, social 
justice and welfare. On the other hand, the term is more narrowly, though still interchangeably, 
used to refer to the revision of Keynesian demand management in this period. The latter is thus a 
more specific and narrowly defined element of the former, and although the terms are 
interchangeable, the narrow meaning of revisionism is used in this thesis.   
                                                          
26 Newman, Michael, pp. 118-119. 
27 Crines, Andrew Scott, pp. 88-105. 
28 Wickham-Jones, Mark, pp. 14-18. 
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4 THE ECONOMIC DEBATE IN THE 1970S 
 
The discontent between the extremities of the party was nothing new in historical terms. Indeed, 
the policy debate between socialism and social democracy was part of a deeper and ongoing 
debate that could be traced all the way back to Gaitskell, Bevan and Attlee, so the debate itself 
was hardly atypical in the Labour Party history.29 Despite this, the party had produced common 
economic platforms before every general election since its conception in 1900. To understand 
why this period broke that record, and failed to produce a platform, it is necessary to identify the 
issues that launched the debate on economic policy. 
The 1960s and the 1970s saw developments that fostered a need for a reappraisal of economic 
strategy in the Labour Party. It seemed that Prime Minister Harold Wilson was failing to deliver 
on his promise of making a ‘New Britain’, forged in ‘the white heat of the [technological] 
revolution’30, and his government was experiencing huge economic problems. These culminated 
in cuts in public spending, a 60 per cent rise in unemployment, increasing national indebtedness, 
and inflation rising from 3.3 per cent in 1964 to an annual rate of 6.4 per cent by the time Wilson 
left office in 1970.31 These economic difficulties resulted in ‘stagflation’, which is when both 
unemployment and inflation rose simultaneously. This meant that Keynesian demand 
management had failed to secure the trade-off between inflation and unemployment that 
economists had previously expected.32 By increasing government spending, and causing more 
inflation, one could also increase employment. This approach was adopted by both Labour and 
the Conservative Party after WWII and remained a cornerstone of the ‘post-war settlement’ until 
the 1970s. A policy of full employment was the main political and economic objective, and 
inflation was the price necessary to pay for it. But inflation decreases Britain’s ability to compete 
in international markets. Higher prices and rising labour costs made sterling more expensive as a 
                                                          
29 Desai, Radhika, pp. 5-10. 
30 Thompson, Noel, pp. 197. 
31 Crewe, Ivor & King, Anthony, pp. 4. 
32 Shaw, Eric, pp. 2-3. 
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currency for trade. Since much of the British economy relied on trade in international markets, 
deflationary response to the sterling to improve Britain’s competitiveness quickly became 
unavoidable. In 1967, Wilson had went on television to inform the British people that he had 
devalued the pound sterling. He assured them that ‘This does not mean that the pound here in 
Britain – in your pocket or purse – is worth any less ...’, but the public perceived it otherwise, 
and it became a devastating legacy for Wilson and the Labour Party, and caused Labour’s ability 
to manage the economy to be questioned.33 If Keynesian demand management could no longer 
sustain Labour’s welfare state, then what could?  
This chapter will examine the intellectual debate around the revision of economic policy, and 
identify the main solutions and ideas that influenced the left and right of the party in the 1970s. 
These ideas provide an understanding for why the left and right were unable to agree on a 
common economic platform, and how the party became dominated by the left in the early 1980s. 
Economists, some of whom are easily identified, such as Roy Jenkins, Anthony Crosland and 
Stuart Holland, who all feature prominently in the literature, made most of the economic 
contributions, while others are less known. The economists selected for study are chosen based 
on cross-referencing of the secondary literature in order to identify the most important of these, 
which is also the method used to explore the main components of  their ideas. The results include 
the five most important schools of thought, and the monetarist alternative.    
4.1 LEFT-WING REVISIONISM 
Having become disenchanted with Wilson, a group of left-wing economists joined together to 
create the Conference of Economic Socialists in 1970.34 There were primarily two economic 
theories on the left of the party that came out of the CES, produced by the academic authors 
Stuart Holland, and Michael Barrat Brown. Each proposed explanations for why Keynesian 
demand management had failed, ideas on how to revise the Keynesian economic strategy, and 
how to counter economic decline.  
                                                          
33 Thorpe, Andrew, pp. 167-168. 
34 Wickham-Jones, Mark, pp. 126-130. 
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The first theory was offered by Holland, who argued that the government had pursued a fusion of 
Keynesian social democracy and unsound indicative planning, which meant that it had failed to 
grasp the point that economics and capitalism had fundamentally changed in the period since the 
war. Ever since the Second World War, Holland argued, there had been a concentration of 
ownership over the means of production, which had resulted monopolies and oligopolies.35 The 
top 100 firms in the UK now commanded half or even more of the key macroeconomic 
aggregates of the economy, including output, industrial manufacturing, employment, assets and 
trade.  
This was particularly troubling when once considered the emergence of the multinational 
corporation, with an international division of labour with national subsidiaries. This organisation 
gave them the opportunity to base themselves in the most economically feasible country. Further, 
they could make, well within the law, intra-company payments that would minimise declared 
profits and maximise undeclared global profits. When coupled with ‘transfer pricing’, where one 
subsidiary traded with another at a fixed price, and while the transfer may be uneconomical or 
appearing to be at a considerable loss, the international company would profit, they possessed a 
very credible and real ability to impact the economy.36 The government, in their pursuit of 
redistributive fiscal and social welfare policies, would be missing out on substantial tax 
revenues, and could be actively obstructed from aggregating the economy. 
By artificially inflating or deflating export and import prices, and thence trade performance and 
exchange rate policy, they could also exert pressure on the exchange rates upwards or 
downwards. In fact, they had done this in 1967, Holland points out, when the companies delayed 
their declaration of profits in expectation of devaluation of pound sterling, which actively exerted 
influence on the exchange rate, forcing the government to act, and thus asserting over the 
decision-makers in the Exchequer.37 Moreover, by not reducing the prices in accordance with the 
extent of the currency devaluation, they could bolster profits and avoid any potential price 
competition, at the cost of reducing the impact any government exchange rate policies intended. 
                                                          
35 Thompson, Noel, pp. 198. 
36 Thompson, Noel, pp. 200. 
37 Thompson, Noel, pp. 200-201. 
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In addition, any threats to relocate, which would lead to substantial regional and national 
increases in unemployment and a drop in production, could be used as a tool to coercing the 
authorities into making concessions on planning and policies that benefitted the companies.38 
Sometimes even blindly giving them the ability to predict and prevent growth of emerging 
indigenous companies and influence prices upward. When undermined in this way, the entire 
foundation for a Keynesian social democratic economy disintegrates, as it assumes that one can 
regulate the activity in an economy, and by extension national employment, by adjusting and 
managing fiscal, monetary and exchange policies. 
Why would they do this? Holland proposed self-interest as the evident explanation, but stressed 
that the companies were not by themselves negative or egotistic, but simply reflected the failures 
of national policy to regulate the economy and stimulate for a socially conscious environment for 
enterprise.39 This explanation returned to the core of the issue; the government simply did not 
possess the institutions and mechanisms to counteract the new economic powers that emerged, 
and would increasingly be at the mercy of the multinationals. Previous nationalisations of 
corporations had been as a response to failing firms in essential areas or sectors, or in sectors 
where private investment was discouraged by high risk, such as technology development and 
basic industries and services.40 This had inevitably created an association with inefficiency in the 
public eye, and a resentment against rationalisation.  
Furthermore, politicians, whose parliamentary tenure never exceeded five years, formed national 
economic policy, whereas corporations often planned for longer terms, and consequently would 
make their investments and programmes independently from national policy and thus had 
developed a resistance or very high tolerance against any aggregate demand.41  
In other words, following the Second World War, the world had seen a globalization of the 
markets, and a shift from national to a dominantly international economy, which emasculated 
any government’s attempts to conduct policies in pursuit of socio-economic goals. This new 
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status quo, being neither macro nor microeconomics and labelled ‘mesoeconomics’, signifies the 
power of economic aggregates was shifted from traditional macroeconomic institutions to sector-
leading multinational corporations.42   
The solution, Holland argued, was to abandon the gradual aspect of Keynes’ social democratic 
system, and pursue combative economic policies to regain economic power from the 
multinational corporations, by hitting them hard and fast.43 This included the selective 
nationalisation of 20-25 of the leading British companies, who operated in sectors of high 
growth, in the course of no more than one parliamentary term. In order to achieve the means to 
implement such a programme of expansion, the state should create a State Holding Company, the 
National Enterprise Board, which could purchase shares on behalf of the government and assert 
direct control of decision-making in the companies. The NEB would be responsible for the 
stimulation of investment and innovation, maximising promotion of exports and domestic import 
substitution, and most importantly, it would transform the public attitudes towards 
nationalisation previously created by earlier first generational nationalisation programmes. The 
public resentment for rationalization had to be overturned by acquiring innovative high-growth 
companies that could prove to the public that the state was capable of being in business and that 
its heavy presence benefited society as a whole.44 
The state could not hope to administer this remedy without the support of the workers, and 
Holland proposed a series of planning agreements between the state, the unions and the 
corporations.45 These agreements would establish a tripartite collaboration that could counteract 
any concentration of power in the hands of the executives, and decrease centralised planning in 
benefit of more collaborative and regional negotiations. In return for this increase in industrial 
democracy, the unions would accept a social contract with the government where they pledged to 
support the economic policies of the government, and the government committed to policies of 
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redistribution of wealth, increasing spending on social welfare and the pursuit of alternatives to 
major redundancy when required.  
Expanded public ownership, increased industrial democracy and a shift to purposive economic 
planning was the only viable solution that could accommodate a non-inflationary, fully 
employed Keynesian economic strategy. 46 
The second prominent economist from the left was Michael Barratt Brown, who published his 
economic treatise in From Labourism to Socialism in 1972.47 Much like Holland, he proposed 
that multinational corporations were responsible for the shift in economic power that had led to 
the economic troubles of the 1970s, and that the solution to this problem was a left-wing 
economic strategy. 
However, Barratt Brown rejected the corporations as the cause of this trouble. Rather, the state is 
the culprit who have failed miserably in its management of the economy.48 The state had actively 
contributed to the shift in power, and emasculated itself by pursuing a policy where firms 
assumed control of diminishing resources, input and markets that in the short-term brought 
economic prosperity to the state, but in the long term contributed to emaciation of resources and 
a loss of potential tax revenue and production. The state furthermore provided support for 
company mergers and hostile takeovers that diminished market competition through the IRC. 
The state had also focused their higher education expenditure in a manner that promoted 
exclusive research that would only benefit a small number of companies, which consequently 
became and remained leading in their sector of the economy. It did not reflect the accelerating 
rate of technological innovation that was salient in the global economy, and thus weakened the 
British industries in their competition with the multinational companies, who could draw on a 
diversely educated labour force and cutting-edge innovation in their subsidiaries. All of these 
factors played a part in the erosion of macroeconomic power, and the emergence of 
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mesoeconomics in the hands of transnational companies (echoing Holland’s ‘multinational 
corporations’.)49 
Not only did size contribute to their economic power, but also the transnational nature of these 
companies made them resilient and evasive of economic policy. A company with subsidiaries 
across the globe would be far less responsive to any domestic economic policy. Diversification 
and trade within the transnationals allowed the companies to function as closed and isolated 
markets. Inside the company machinery, they could trade between subsidiaries at fixed prices in 
the system Holland presented as ‘transfer pricing’, and arrange for the transmission of funds and 
management to the countries whose economic policy would prove most profitable to the 
company, or even illegally to conceal profits from tax declarations.50 In addition, in the context 
of increasing international tensions, increasing defence spending made the government 
interdependent on the companies producing the material for the military, which was damaging to 
state autonomy.   
The solution, Barrat Brown argued, was still very Keynesian. Demolition of the market power of 
these companies was necessary, or at the very least to decrease the power, all the while with the 
intermediate goal of maintaining full employment.51 If accomplished, inflation would be 
unproblematic, and the trade-off with employment resumed. After all, full employment would 
mean increased output, income and expenditure, and a system of price controls would ensure 
manageable inflation.  As to any repercussions the pursuit of full employment might have for the 
balance of payments and exchange rates, these could be controlled with strict import and 
exchange controls, and international trade agreements, although not in the form of the EEC’s free 
trade agreements.  
The welfare state should not only maintain its present status quo and committing to increasing 
social welfare expenditure, but rather seek to include the provision of more social goods, and 
prove its major interventionist capacity for the welfare of the people. Again, there was the need 
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for trade union support, but in terms of industrial democracy, Barratt Brown did not seek the 
tripartite collaboration of Holland. During the 1970s, there had been ample evidence of the 
workers’ ability to govern themselves through sit-ins and industrial action as well as their ability 
to participate in rational arguments regarding the efficiency and productivity of industry.52 The 
industrial democracy could thus safely be strengthened with a system of checks and vetoes 
against company management on topics of economy, pay, employment, firing and redundancy.   
Barrat Brown’s idea of a self-governing industry was an idea with great appeal to many in the 
Labour party and the trade union movement. In the last decades, there had been significant rises 
in trade union organisations, and the emergence of transnational corporations meant that never 
before had there been such a great distance between the central executives and the workers on 
the floor.53 This led to increasing resentment amongst the workers, who found themselves 
frequently subjected to managerial decrees that ran contrary to their own perceptions of 
efficiency and productivity.  
The Institute for Worker’s Control was established in 1972 at the Party Conference, to provide 
the framework and assistance to those seeking trade union organisation, and service those unions 
already established.54 The IWC came an important voice in the Labour Party for strengthening 
industrial democracy in Britain, and upholding the social contract between Labour and the 
unions. It came to represent a moderate Brownite view of self-governing industry, and presented 
several papers on industrial democracy in the 1970s. These would call for greater transparency in 
boardrooms and management decisions, where workers were represented with significant powers 
of veto over the appointments of those managers and was allotted significant promises in party 
papers in the 1970s:   
‘Our aim is to make industry democratic - to develop joint control and action by 
management and workers across the whole range of industry, commerce and the public 
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services. […] This objective involves strong trade union organisation and widening the 
scope of collective bargaining.’55 
Although frequently playing with the idea of self-governing industries, and questioning the 
executives’ raison d’être, the organisation never managed to gain the complete socialist 
ownership over the means and management of production.  
4.2 LIBERAL SOCIALISM REVISED 
 
On the other hand, the 1970s provided the liberal socialists with a headache. The Wilson 
governments had tried to manage the economy in troubling times, using a combination of 
indicative planning and Keynesian demand management, but unemployment remained high, 
industrial unrest plagued the country, and Britain seemed be caught in an endless cycle of 
balance of payment crises.56  
The left presented a clear explanation of why Keynesianism had failed to produce the fertile soil 
in which social democracy could flourish. More importantly, the left produced a clear alternative 
that suggested remedies for these shortcomings and significant benefits for the people if 
mainstream Labour subscribed to them.  
This might explain why the left dominated economic debate inside the Labour Party in this 
period. The liberal socialist wing of the party might have suffered from a lack of credibility 
based on their records in government under Wilson and Callaghan, but they certainly did not lack 
the intellectual capacity to revise Keynesianism so that it could be a vessel for social democracy 
in Britain. There were three names from the liberal socialists prominent in the debate: Roy 
Jenkins, James Meade and Anthony Crosland.57 
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These contributors were unwilling to accept the interpretation of the left wing, rejecting them as 
a form of “refurbished Marxism”.58 After all, the Wilson government had achieved considerable 
progress in other fields of the economy, and so the economic strategy required only the revision 
of those aspects where it had failed, such as damping inflationary pressures.  Inflation was the 
great danger, which had several major implications for economic policy.  If the government did 
not tackle inflation, long-term unemployment and sustainable economic growth would be 
impossible.  
Roy Jenkins had served briefly as Chancellor in the late 1960s under Wilson, and been active in 
the economic debate in the party for many years. Therefore, he had personal interest in revising 
the Keynesian policies he had implemented as Chancellor. He called for a revision of the purpose 
of economic policy.59 What was the central goal for the economic strategy? Was it the indicative 
attempts to fend off the repeating troubles with balance of payments? The government had failed 
in their strategy because short terms goals, such as overcoming the balance of payments deficits 
has taken precedence over the long term objectives that the government should pursue. Why? 
The balance of payments deficits has immediate and severe implications for much of the 
electorate, and stabilizing these were necessary to resume an environment for sustained 
economic growth.60 
The government had to be clear in their priorities, Jenkins argued, and provide an economic 
strategy that held social justice as the central theme, and be committed long term to that 
objective.61 A long-term commitment to social justice would strengthen the social contract with 
the trade unions. It was the workers, who suffered the most under the inflationary policies, and 
increasing inflation gave the unions a feeling of wage-erosion. The commitment to social justice 
would thus by necessity include a prices and incomes policy, to ensure proper redistribution of 
wealth and social welfare. If apposite incomes policies were implemented, including the 
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introduction of a national minimal wage, prices would be stabilised, but the government should 
be prepared to intervene in the economy if necessary to secure key prices that affect the real 
income of wage earners.   
It was also necessary to make a substantial extension of public ownership to obtain the necessary 
mechanism to implement these policies, and Jenkins presented his argument in What Matters 
Now in 1972: 
 ‘[The] Government, acting through the public sector, can adopt a broader perspective than 
that of any board of directors nominally responsible to its shareholders. It can view an 
investment in a much longer time scale. It can estimate the benefit of an industrial 
development in the community as a whole, in terms of new jobs and better use of social 
capital. It can assess the profitability of any single project in the context to other linked 
developments. Often the scale of the development required to provide the base for a new 
industrial complex is too great for any individual firm to take the risk. Perhaps, most 
important of all, the Government alone can estimate the costs of inaction as well as action. 
The problems of the regions will not be cured without more direct Government 
involvement and a greater use of public enterprise.’62 
To make this a reality, Jenkins supported the notion of a State Holding Company that could 
administer this expansion, and fuel itself by the profits it made, very similar to the proposal of 
Stuart Holland. However, there were significant differences in how expansive this company 
should be, and Jenkins argued that it was a tool to strengthen regional economies and the 
performance of a largely Keynesian economy, whereas Holland viewed it as a monumental 
shift in power and the return of control over the means of production to the workers.63  
James Meade, on the other hand, was sceptical. As a distinguished political economist who 
would go on to win the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1977, he believed it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to regulate an entire economy through price policies.64 The economy was far too 
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complex, and although a Stabilizing Committee could make some progress, it was unlikely to 
solve the problem without a massive centralisation and extension of public ownership.  
Meade’s proposal shares one important similarity with the left-wing economists Holland and 
Barrat Brown. The emergence of large multinational corporations that dominated the economy 
was responsible for the failure of economic strategy. However, this was not due to their 
emasculating influence of government economic aggregates, but rather their influence on 
inflation. Monopolies circumvented the price levels of a competitive market, and thus had 
inflationary implications on the economy. Meade then proposed that economic policy should 
encourage the dispersal of monopolies into small-scale enterprise, which could operate in a 
competitive and fair environment.65 This meant replacing the corporate tax with a tax on number 
of employees, the creation of special sources of finance for small-scale businesses and anti-
monopoly legislation. This strategy would include not only restrictions on the size and power of 
companies, but also completely free imports of products from foreign companies, a substantial 
tax on advertisement, and the prohibition of restrictive practises such as transfer pricing or price 
agreements.66 
Overall, the solution was to use price competition as the immediate antidote against inflation. 
The bureaucrat would not be capable of regulating price policies, so the market would constrain 
price level rises by competition. This did not exclude direct intervention into the economy, 
Meade assured, and when required, it is the duty of the state to contemplate the establishment of 
social ownership with determined prices. 
Meade also rejected any incomes policy, as this would be unnecessary with full competition, and 
any attempts to create such a short-term policy would eventually infringe on notions of fairness 
in the economy, and erode away. Should it be voluntary, on the other hand, the TUC and the CBI 
would dominate it; monopolies that worked counter to the remedy Meade prescribed.67  
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The suggestion then, was a set of wage increase norms, which could be calculated by the 
Stabilizing Committee and serve as an indication of what was reasonable to negotiate in the 
current economy. In order for this to work, the corporations needed increased transparency and 
information on profitability, production, demand and supply of labour made available to the 
workers.68 It also would require means to penalise the trade unions who went out of line with 
their demands. This, Meade, argued, would restore control over the labour monopolies and begin 
the transition towards an economy where small was beautiful.  
The third contributor on the right wing of the party, Anthony Crosland, disagreed with Meade, 
and supported the implementation, although difficult as it might be, of a prices and incomes 
policy.  
‘I have no doubts in my mind that we must have a prices and incomes policy. We must 
have it because the only alternative will be squeeze and deflation …, and unemployment. I 
personally … believe that a prices and incomes policy is also necessary for reasons of 
social justice, and reasons of social equality.’ 69  
Crosland too accepted the argument made by Jenkins over an expansion of public ownership 
through the State Holding Company, although he maintained a more critical view of the premise 
of this company. After all, Crosland argued, the concentration of power that Holland and Barrat 
Brown suggested, concurred with a significant increase in public spending through the 1960s and 
1970s, and the government regulated the economy extensively through legislation and trade 
unions were undoubtedly strengthened.70 This did not equate to any significant shift in economic 
power to the private companies. Nor did studies suggest the multinationals were unfaithful in 
relation to their host country, and the evidence was an increase in real wages in 2 per cent 
through inward investment, and transfer pricing controllable through legislation.71 The State 
Holding Company would thus not actively combat the multinational corporations, as laying 
down the foundations for a more stable and fair economy. Backed up by a State Investment Bank 
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to fund, advise and insure the SHC, it would produce leading companies that consolidated the 
public enterprise. 
Jenkins and Crosland agreed that the progress of socialism was dependant on a revised 
Keynesian strategy that included the expansion of public ownership and a restructuring of the 
industrial base, which would reinvigorate the supply side of the economy so that Keynesian 
aggregate demand again could reverse the economic decline. Together with Meade, the three 
also shared a commitment to redistribution of wealth through taxation, but although they 
contributed significantly to the right’s revisionism, they were overlooked in party papers by the 
more prominent and left-leaning Stuart Holland. Despite this, their ideas influenced the right 
greatly, and the social democrats in the party were committed to Croslandite ideas, and those 
who departed from the party in 1981 to the Jenkinsite economics.72  
4.3 LABOUR IN THE 70S: THE ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
 
It was in this context of widely differing solutions and analyses that Labour sought to formulate 
an economic strategy. This strategy, known as the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), became 
a staple for the Labour left, and influenced party papers for more than a decade. In the 
formulation of this strategy, the economic school of Stuart Holland dominated, and was able to 
do so out of several reasons.73 The left was slowly beginning to strengthen its position in the 
party after repeated economic turmoil for the Wilson government. Furthermore, Roy Jenkins, 
who had been pivotal to the social liberal wing of the party on economic policy, made the 
decision to resign from his post as Deputy Party Leader, over deep dissatisfaction on European 
policy. This was a devastating blow to the social liberals, because Roy Jenkins had also been 
Chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee, and could greatly influence the economic 
policies of the party up until his resignation.74 
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The result was a handbook in left-wing economics, echoing Holland and Barrat Brown heavily. 
Labour would seek to make a long-term capital investment in a greatly expanded public sector, 
which included the nationalisation of the 25 leading companies.75 They would also nationalise 
developing land, mineral deposits, oil deposits in the North Sea and shipping, including the 
manufacturing of ships. To do this, they would establish a State Holding Company, the National 
Enterprise Board. The National Enterprise Board under parliamentary control would operate to 
provide the economic aggregates the government had lost, and supply job creation, investment 
promotion, technological development, export growth and promoting policies, including 
industrial democracy and import substitution.76 
They would also make planning agreements with the leading 100 companies in the British 
economy.77 Selective financial aid would be provided to companies who embraced the 
government’s social policy, whereas those companies who resisted would be coerced to comply 
through sanctions. The unions gained reserve powers over some decisions in the companies, and 
an official Trustee would represent the state in the tripartite negotiations. All of these measures 
aimed to tackle the fundamental problem of multinational corporations’ control of the economy.  
It was then hardly surprising that the Crosland and Jenkins were highly critical of this strategy, 
and Shirley Williams and Edmund Bell made public criticisms of the left. They all hailed from 
the social liberal wing of the party, and were adamant in their claims that the Alternative 
Economic Strategy was misguided in its premise. The left had made a fallacious equation 
between nationalisation and socialist progress, argued the critics and in addition, it would have 
severe ramifications for the economy and the confidence in British companies if the government 
could pursue these expansive economic policies.78 Britain would not appear a feasible market to 
companies seeking new ground, if the international companies got the impression that the British 
government were eager to intervene in the economy. Furthermore, an expansion of state control, 
would result in an expansion of bureaucracy which when combined would harm British 
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competitiveness.  Finally, the remedy suggested was the same remedy that had failed earlier; the 
large nationalized industries faced public difficulties when forced to rationalize, they were 
unresponsive to policy due to their existence in a market environment and would be difficult to 
manage. It seemed evident that the giant national conglomerates would act independently of 
ministerial control, which meant that the state no levers of power. The economist Wilfrid 
Beckerman also began to challenge the notion of the power of the multinational corporation.79 It 
was, Beckerman observed, also subject to the strict competition, and thence regulated by market 
limitations.  
Despite this critique from the right of the party, the AES was central to party documents of the 
1970s, and the 1973 Programme carried much of the left’s revised strategy.80 It promised a new 
social contract with the unions, where the government committed itself to pursuing an 
accelerated rate of ecological growth, extensive economic planning, rising social welfare 
expenditure, redistributive fiscal policies, tight control on the costs of living. They would 
negotiate an agreement that provided stable prices and orderly growth of incomes. In terms of 
industrial democracy, it offered the trade unions extensive power, by promising the provision of 
direct representations on the boards, Supervisory Boards to supervise management as well as 
joint control committees. 81 
The staunch criticisms that the left had attracted from the right did result in some modifications, 
though. The 25 companies for nationalisation, and what coercive powers the state was to have 
against non-compliance with policy was noticeably undefined in the 1974 Programme ‘Let’s 
work together’, despite the overall extension of public ownership in oil, gas, developing land, 
shipping and aeroplane construction.82  
The major difference, however, came when Labour won the election in 1974. Edward Heath’s 
Conservative government had suffered massive industrial unrest and by necessity implemented a 
three-day week, which was hugely unpopular with the electorate. Shortly after the election, the 
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Confederation of British Industry voiced their concern in 1974 about a loss in industrial 
confidence if the plans for the National Enterprise Board were implemented, and when the 
Treasury concluded that an expansion of public ownership could have inflationary effects on the 
economy, the AES began to disintegrate in government policy.83 The Treasury also maintained 
that planning agreements with the industry would be impossible to enforce by law, and the 
disclosure of information would be unnecessary. The ‘Official Trustee’ disappeared, and the 
interventionist powers of the NEB left curbed and greatly reduced. In the end, Wilson and his 
Chancellor Denis Healey had emasculated the AES and abandoned the interventionist approach 
by listening to the concerns of the CBI and the Treasury over the Party Conference, giving the 
right wing the victory in implantation of policy.84  
Naturally, the left was furious at this U-turn and disregard of the Labour Party Conference on 
economic policy. Shortly after the election, Wilson unexpectedly announced his retirement, and 
left the party in the hands of his Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. The right wing Callaghan 
won the leadership election narrowly over left wing Michael Foot, having greater credibility in 
economic policy, and began the fight against inflation. This contradicted the AES which the 
Party Conference had agreed on, but solved little in terms of inflation. In 1977, the Labour 
government found themselves in the most difficult situation yet. Chancellor Denis Healy had not 
accounted for such an increase, and the budget faced a catastrophic £ 3.5 billion deficit, which 
had to be provided by a loan from the International Monetary Fund, complete with major 
reductions in public spending.85 This meant tackling the trade unions on pay increases to curb 
further inflation, and became instantly unpopular. The Labour government quickly became 
plagued with the same industrial unrest that brought down Edward Heath. The demonstration-
plagued winter of 1978 became known as the Shakespearian ‘Winter of Discontent’, and the 
general election defeat in 1979 was inevitable.86   
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The leftist ascendancy reached its zenith when Labour went into opposition. Once again, the 
Labour government had failed to fulfil the promises it had made, and this time gone blatantly 
against the expressed wishes of the Conference. The left of the party had stood by and seen how 
their economic strategy was dismantled and abandoned, and the outcome had once again been a 
period of economic unrest and stagflation. It thus presented a double accusation against the 
leadership of the party, where the Parliamentary Labour Party had become a tool of the party 
leadership, rather than the party organisation, and that they no longer recognized their 
subordinate position to the supreme Party Conference.87  
The left made three specific proposals to the Labour Conference in 1981 to remedy this, and 
strengthen the National Executive Committee, the party’s highest instance on policy between the 
annual Party Conferences, where the left had a majority of the members.88 The NEC would be 
responsible of the final draft of the election manifestos, the MPs would be subject to annual 
reselections by their constituencies, and in addition, a newly established electoral college, in 
which representatives of the constituencies, unions and the PLP, would elect the party leadership. 
James Callaghan realised that if the vote passed, and an electoral college came to existence, it 
was likely that a representative of the left wing, such as Tony Benn, would ascend to the 
leadership.89 In a move to ensure continuing left-of-centre dominance of the party, he promptly 
announced his intention to resign, and that the party would elect a new leader before the 
Electoral College became the reality. This was a move widely agreed to have paved the way for 
Denis Healey, the former Chancellor, Home Secretary and prominent social democrat.  
The reality became quite different. The left had backed Tony Benn as their candidate, but 
foreseeing the difficulties of uniting a party with such a hard-liner and adversarial leader, they 
sought to find a candidate with a greater appeal across party divisions. In the end, they managed 
to persuade Michael Foot to accept the candidacy, and in one of the closest leadership elections 
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in Labour history, won the contest against Healey, who became Deputy Leader. The election was 
so close that only the swing of six votes in Healey’s favour would have made him the winner.90  
 
4.3.1 The New Way: Monetarism  
 
There were also those who saw Keynesian revision as insufficient, and rejected the long tradition 
of Keynesian economics in Britain. In 1975, the Conservative Party had elected Margaret 
Thatcher as their party leader, who had run on a platform of radical economic reform, and she 
would spend the next years consolidating the new economic position in her party. The response 
to Keynes on the other side of the political spectrum was in sharp contrast with the solutions in 
the Labour Party, and influenced by a new school of thought, spearheaded by American 
economist Milton Friedman and his ‘Chicago School’.91  
This new economic thinking, named ‘monetarism’, was severely critical of the Keynesian trade-
off between inflation and employment, and raised questions as to whether or not extensive 
government spending equated to net permanent employment.92 In the short term, there would 
definitely be favourable outcomes and temporary relief for the unemployed, but in the long term, 
the ensuing inflation would cause a rise in price levels that would eventually surpass salaries. 
Moreover, the rampant inflation would harm the competiveness of British companies. 
Friedman then proposed the existence of a ‘natural rate of unemployment’ in the economy, 
which meant that the economy would have a level of unemployment parallel to the level of 
inefficiency in the economy. 93 When the government attempted to increase employment beyond 
the natural rate, by inflationary action, i.e. increased government spending, they would 
effectively create stagflation. Such a monetary expansion would lead to a rise in the rate of 
inflation, and the subsequent erosion of international corporative competitiveness would end in 
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recurring balance of payment crisis. Keynesian policies would in effect create the very obstacle it 
sought to overcome.  
What then caused the economic inefficiency in the first place? The antagonist, argued Friedman, 
where the powers that prevented full competitiveness in the economy, who pushed production 
costs up and interfered with the corporation’s management. In other words; the trade unions.94  
In the Labour party, this was certainly not the preferred school of thought, because it was counter 
to what many Labour politicians held as the traditional objectives of the Labour movement; full 
employment, social security and industrial democracy.95 Even so, the failures of Keynesian 
economics had shaken British politics to the core, and it was difficult to reject the monetarist 
approach to inflation completely, even though the remedy prescribed was hard to swallow. After 
all, the liberal social Jenkins, Meade and Crosland had all argued for targeting inflation as 
obstacle to growth, while Holland on the left wing of the party voiced similar concerns. 
Furthermore, the sterling crisis of 1976 drove James Callaghan and the Labour government into 
the hands of IMF in order to find economic confidence. Thompson suggest that they were 
‘tainted, if not seduced’ by a monetarist approach.96 
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5 THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE 1980S  
 
The Labour Party thus went into the 1980s in a new political environment, where the party was 
no longer burdened with the realities of office, and still trying to come to terms with the their 
defeat following failed economic policies.  
In this chapter, the debate is carried into the 1980s and Michael Foot’s tenure and Labour Party 
Leader. It investigates the political debate on economic policy in the context of opposition and 
increasing left-wing dominance, and how the social democrats responded to losing their hold on 
the party, and how the party leadership attempted to negotiate peace.  
The people identified in this chapter have been selected for study on two criteria. Firstly, based 
on their positions within Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party, where the natural focal 
point is leadership or influence. Secondly, based on their contributions to the debate on economic 
policy and whether they produced a political work that included a discussion on economic policy 
or industrial democracy. Special focus was naturally paid to any discussion on party unity or 
division. For this reason, Roy Jenkins and Bill Rodgers were not utilized to their full potential, as 
Jenkins did not participate in the debate in Britain during his Presidency of the European 
Commission, and Bill Rodgers did not produce a political book similar to Shirley Williams and 
David Owen. Furthermore, Michael Foot, Tony Benn and Denis Healey have been selected for 
their prominence as leaders, although in the latter case, leadership outweighed the second 
criteria, and memoirs have been considered sufficient.  
5.1 THE SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE 
 
The figurehead of Labours socialist hard left was Tony Benn, who rose to prominence in the 
1960s when leading the fight for peers to renounce their titles to that they would be eligible to sit 
in the House of Commons.97 Much more than his social democratic colleagues in the party and 
parliament, Benn welcomed the economic turmoil as an invitation to a broader debate on policy. 
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By failing to provide the capital investment and equipment for the highly skilled, Benn argued, 
Britain was engaging in a process of unwanted deindustrialisation, caused by conflicting interests 
and a lack of political vision.98 Since a deindustrialised economy would lose the economic 
strength to maintain and support a comprehensive social security network, the welfare state 
would be effectively dismantled. The IMF loan and consequential cuts in public expenditure 
proved that the right wing were incapable of managing the economy, and arrest the industrial 
decline that would eventually erode the foundation for socialism in Britain.  
In his book, Arguments for Socialism (1979), Benn outlined his solution to Britain’s economic 
decline and argued the case for a more radical and interventionist state. With views very much 
akin to that of Holland and Barrat Brown, Benn assumed the unofficial leadership of the hard 
left, and became the political proponent for a far-left economic strategy, that he believed should 
seek to overthrow the power of capital. 
“The debate about democratic socialism which is now in progress in Britain is also taking 
place all over the world and its appeal is so great that it will prevail over both capitalism 
and communism.” 99  
The crisis was deindustrialisation and by extension of unemployment. Unemployment not only 
left people outside of the labour market and caused frictions between employed and unemployed 
over social security, but also diverted funds away from satisfying social needs. Furthermore, 
although women were far more integrated into the labour market than ever before, they still held 
positions that were extremely vulnerable to sudden economic downturns. Abandoning an 
economic strategy for full employment, as Wilson and Callaghan had done, had both monetary 
and social consequences that were insufferable for the economy in the long term. The result was 
such inexplicable contradictions as overcrowded classrooms and unemployed teachers.100 (141) 
Benn argued that the monetarist alternative was rooted in the doctrines of Adam Smith and 
laissez-faire economics, and that it was flawed because it relied on competition to achieve its 
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goals of efficiency, productivity and profitability. As is always the case with competition, Benn 
argued, there is winners and losers.101 Benn suggested that the victors were the monopolies who 
assumed economic powers so great that they could threaten national sovereignty, which was a 
very similar argument to that made by Holland a decade earlier. Benn also thought that 
capitalism was a threat to democracy, and that equally democracy was a threat to capitalism. 
Unemployment, welfare reduction and the prospect of increased economic and social inequality 
was the antithesis of the Labour movement, so the Labour Party held a particular responsibility 
for providing the strategy to counter these developments, and democratic socialism was the most 
viable solution to the crisis of unemployment.  
In order to counter the deindustrialisation, it was necessary to support, develop and invest in the 
domestic British economy, and especially the labour market. Material resources were finite, but 
the expansion of intellectual property was endless, and would be a new and radical new form of 
growth.102 The government had to invest in the labour force by intelligent and democratic 
planning, which included making higher education more available to the masses, investing and 
expanding the public sector and reducing social and economic differences. 
The prices and incomes policies, argued by the liberal socialists, were rejected entirely, because 
it was ‘narrow, limited and obsessive.’103 Wages were undeniably an important form of wealth 
redistribution and a means to reduce socio-economic differences, but any form of militant and 
singular focus on this object would result in policies similar to those who brought the economic 
instability. However, if industrial democracy were accordingly extended, it would include the 
unions in more than just wage-negotiations, and contribute to investment and support of local 
communities. 
In the short-term, technology might lead to the redundancy of some workers, but in the long term 
represented a necessity in order to maintain productivity, efficiency, and the legitimacy of 
employment. Tony Benn offered the following conclusion: 
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 ‘Democratic socialism which combines direct public investment in industry and expanded 
public expenditure, combined with self-management does offer a real prospect of resolving 
the present deadlock, and protecting personal freedom.’104  
It is seems Benn was greatly influenced by the Holland and Barrat Brown works, and the AES in 
his work, and ‘Arguments for Socialism’ fuses the two together by focusing on a policy of 
employment with intellectual growth and reindustrialisation at its hearth, and an expansion of 
industrial democracy that includes planning agreements and union powers.   
On the question of party unity, Benn and the left were little concerned with the divisions evident 
in Labour. The left gained control of the party once the defectors left, and without them, the 
party could return to the traditional and true socialist objectives. Callaghan and Wilson had 
tainted it with monetarism. Foot and Healey’s efforts to minimalize the divisive devastation was 
mocked by Benn in his memoirs as foolish pursuits of weak party members. ‘He now has to lie 
in the bed that he has made’ 105, he wrote in relation to the issues that Foot faced when tackling 
the militant left. This attitude was likely to have contributed greatly to the lack of a concerted 
effort for party unity, and strengthened the social democratic resolve to find a new vehicle for 
social democracy. 
The left’s influence on the 1983 Manifesto was very evident, given their control of the party 
machinery and the NEC. It pledged that the Labour Party would ‘launch a massive programme 
for expansion’106, which included investment, construction, social welfare and 
reindustrialisation. But most importantly, it pledged to nationalize the corporations that the 
Tories had privatized, a measure that was very unpopular amongst the new home-owners who 
had bought council houses under the ‘Right to Buy’-scheme, which had been introduced by the 
Thatcher government in 1980.  
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5.1.1 Meacher and Hodgson 
 
There were also those who sought to transcend the already radical AES, and return Labour to its 
socialist roots. Michael Meacher published his approach in ‘Socialism with a human face’, and 
sought to promote a revolutionary transformation of the British economy.107 The number of 
organized workers had risen substantially in the course of the 1960s and 1970s, and was 
interpreted to be an expression of working class distaste for a materialistic economy.  
The solution, Meacher argued, was a ‘steady-state economy’108. A utopian self-sufficient society 
with constant total population and total stock of wealth, which was regulated and determined to 
certain levels by a government that promoted a non-material growth, such as creative leisure, 
sports, arts and education that had no implications on the finite resources. 
In order to achieve this utopia, the government would have to implement policies that would 
insulate the British economy for foreign and international pressures, to protect the economy for 
an unregulated flow of money and investment that could offset the overall balance of payments. 
Quickly criticized as a ‘siege economy’, Meacher stressed that the emphasis lay on the avoidance 
of an unregulated flow of money, and that exports and imports could be maintained by trade 
agreements, and that a managed economy in the long term actually would absorb more imports 
than a deflationary one.109  
Domestically, the economy would be subject to detailed planning by a central bureaucratic 
apparatus, and a price and value system that was independent of market value. This traced back 
to the socialist idea of ‘true value of labour’110, where price was relative to the labour consumed 
in production and profits would be exploitation of labour, but went even further by reflecting 
costs of finite resources and environmental impact to determine ‘the relative true value of 
different projects’.  
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The economist Geoffrey Hogdson joined Meacher in this pursuit, and in The Democratic 
Economy (1984) and Labour at the Crossroads (1981) identified the transformative agency of 
the economic revolution as extended industrial democracy.111 Arguing that ‘the system as a 
whole is determined by the relations of power’, socialism should embody a collectivisation of 
those relations.112 The AES did go some way to increase industrial democracy, but it had to be 
radically extended to engage the workers in more than pay policy, and integrate them into 
determining industrial and economic strategies. This would create a social and humanistic 
political economy that bred new socialists, produced social benefits rather than profits, and 
unleashed the creative and productive energies of the workforce to transform the supply side of 
the economy. In the end, this would empower the working class and shatter the capitalist 
relations of power, and keep social purpose rather than profit at the centre of the economy.  
The influence these radicals had on actual party policy was marginal, and many scholars degrade 
them to nothing more than the last push of the left before it disintegrated and disappeared.113 In 
historical terms, that is correct, and the hard left has not represented a significant force in British 
politics and the Labour Party since. It is, however, necessary to include these because they were 
present and contributed to the mood of the debate in the 1970s and 1980s, and as such 
represented an extremity in the party that seemed to be gaining momentum. That contribution, 
with its monolithic and almost revolutionary policies, created an adversarial atmosphere between 
the left and the right in the party, and caused increasingly disheartened social democratic Labour 
members to doubt whether the Labour Party was capable of representing their views. 
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5.2 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE RIGHT 
 
Immediately after the Wembley Labour Conference in 1981 when the propositions of the left 
was accepted, although barely, a group of social democrats gathered to discuss the prospects of a 
new party devoted to social democracy. This group of prominent politicians, including Shirley 
Williams, Bill Rodgers and David Owen, were quickly joined by Roy Jenkins, who returned to 
Britain after serving as President of the European Commission. To them, the reforms signified a 
permanent decline in the right’s dominance of the party, and they feared having to be held 
accountable to left-wing policies they did not support. Together they announced the 
establishment of a Council for Social Democracy, which shortly after became the Social 
Democratic Party, and under the leadership of Jenkins, formed an alliance with the Liberal Party 
under David Steel.114 29 MPs, mainly Labour, deflected to the new party that quickly became a 
political reality, and the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance saw great popularity in the polls, but 
failed to gain substantial support at the 1983 election.115  
There can be no doubt that the Wembley Conference was the catalyst that initiated the first 
stages of the schism, but seeing as the changes to the party democracy, with the exception of the 
electoral college with trade union block vote, were not necessarily biased towards the left, at 
least not permanently. If the social democrats had the majority on the NEC, they would have 
enjoyed the same advantages. Murmurs of a new party was also not new, arose earlier than 1981. 
Indeed, the election of Michael Foot as leader is generally accepted to have been attributable to a 
small group of soon-to-be deflectors who found it easier to justify their action if the party leader 
was from the left.116   
Why did they choose to leave? The disagreement must have been more fundamental and 
politically motivated. To investigate whether or not economic policy was a substantial part of 
this, it is necessary to examine the publications of some of the leading members of the Social 
Democratic Party, as well as the statements and manifesto of the party in the 1983 election 
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campaign.  One must also take into account that economic policy would not have been the only 
cause of the split, and as Meredith points out, the initial division in the Labour social democratic 
right was on the issue of Europe.117 Is it then possible to make a distinction between policy on 
Europe and economic strategy, when a response to the Common Market certainly would be a 
part of any political strategy? Alternatively, must one consider the two issues to be 
interconnected and inseparable?  
Clues as to why the schism began can be found in the Limehouse Declaration that launched the 
Council for Social Democracy in 1981, and where the now Gang of Four explained;   
 ‘We want more, not less, radical change in our society; but with a greater stability of 
direction. Our economy needs a healthy public sector and a healthy private sector without 
frequent frontier changes. We want to eliminate poverty and promote greater equality 
without stifling enterprise or imposing bureaucracy from the centre. We need the 
innovating strength of a competitive economy with a fair distribution of rewards. We 
favour competitive public enterprise, cooperative ventures and profit-sharing. There must 
be more decentralization of decision-making in industry and government, together with an 
effective and practical system of democracy at work. […] The council will represent a 
coming together of several streams: politicians who recognize that the drift towards 
extremism in the Labour party is not compatible with the democratic traditions of the party 
they joined, and those outside politics who believe that the country cannot be saved 
without changing the sterile and rigid framework into which the British political system 
has increasingly fallen in the last two decades.’118 
As a political statement of intention rather than actual policies, it is necessary to consider these 
pledges cautiously. Even so, the support expressed for a mixed economy, competition and 
decentralisation is a stark contrast to the views expressed by the left. The most important 
sentence is perhaps the sentence that justify the establishment of the Council, which must be 
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noted was a part of the Labour Party for a short period before the Party was launched, was: ‘We 
do not believe in the politics of an inert centre purely representing the lowest common 
denominator between two extremes.’119  
Shirley Williams wrote in her book ‘Politics is for People’ (1981) a lengthy and elaborate 
explanation as to why it was necessary to split the party into two separate parliamentary parties, 
since ‘Institutions have bred attitudes, especially class attitudes, that militate against a common 
effort to resolve her problems.’120 
The problem, as Williams saw it, was that the socialists failed to notice a shift in the balance of 
opinion against social democracy. The pledges of the left, such as nationalisation and extension 
of the public sector was no longer realistic, and most had been found wanting in practise. 
However, most importantly, those who sought to revolutionize and break the system would also 
break the democracy that stemmed from it. The pluralist democracy emanated from a pluralist 
economy, and if this were to be exchanged for the democratic centralism of the left, one would 
end up with a democratic system akin to the inner-party democracy that Lenin established.121 
David Owen and Bill Rodgers shared this conviction too; and argued that ‘centralized statism’ 
was wholly incompatible with the social democratic tradition of decentralized government. 122 
Williams then concluded that the Social Democratic Party was a necessary response to 
increasing extremism in the Labour Party:  
‘Reformers cannot support the concentration of power inherent in a monolithic economy, 
whether it is commanded by a corporatist, communist or military government. […] There 
is no possibility of reconciling the reformers and the revolutionaries for their objectives are 
incompatible.’123 
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The split thus was attributable to the simple emergence of an extreme hard left and by 
strengthening their hold on the party organization; the social democrats feared they would 
have to be held accountable to policies they did not support, and that the centre in politics had 
suffered a hopeless and irreversible decline. Since economic policy was the issue on which 
the hard left and the social democrats clashed, it is safe to establish it as one of the decisive 
driving forces behind the 1981-establishment of the Social Democratic Party.124 
Despite disagreement on economic policy, the social democrats had run on an AES-platform for 
much of the 1970s. Desai argues that the AES in moderation was not incompatible with social 
democratic policy, and that many of the social democrats inside and outside of the party were 
open to an expansion of public ownership and some increase in industrial democracy.125 
However, this view takes an overly optimistic approach to the two schools of thought. The 
socialist desire to manage, plan and insulate the British economy would compromise the mixed 
economy that the social democrats desired, and concentrate and increase centralised power to 
curb inflation. Since such a concentration was principally disagreeable to the social democrats, 
this could be avoided with a prices and incomes policy, which would manage inflation and 
growth, but be unacceptable to the trade unions as it limited their powers. In other words, they 
held solutions that was disagreeable to the other side, and considering the left’s ascendancy, the 
social democrats would have to make concessions to the socialists, who in return gave little more 
than a platform for opposition. It was correct, however, that the social democrats had initially 
been open to the AES, but the relationship became ambiguous and eventually hostile as it 
became increasingly identified with the hard left and an anti-Europe platform.126 Consensus 
could then probably have been reached if both sides sought moderation and compromise in the 
debate.  
There were also those on the right that did not agree with this division of ideologies, and Healey 
stepped up to the plate to argue against weakening the social democratic strain of the party, 
backed by prominent MPs such as Roy Hattersley, Peter Shore and Gerald Kaufman: 
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‘A new centre party was most unlikely to establish itself as a serious competitor with the 
Labour Party; on the other hand, that the moderates had a good chance of winning a 
majority on the NEC, and thus transforming the situation – but this was bound to take 
several years.’127  
Some argue that the split was also one on European policy, which alienated many of the social 
democrats within Labour form joining the new party. The majority of social democrats did not 
share the Jenkinsite ‘Euro-fanaticism’ and Jenkins, as a person, did not always command 
admiration.  However, as Crewe and King points out, the Jenkinsites were unable to attract 
the majority of pro-Europe social democrats inside Labour, and because of doubt concerning 
their electability as SDP candidates and the dynamics of a party led by Roy Jenkins.128 This 
means that the question of Europe played a minor role to overall economic policy in the split.    
Nonetheless, the party began formulating its election manifesto with the Liberals, whose Leader 
David Steel was a close friend of Jenkins and had begun preparing his party for the absorption of 
the SDP before it was launched. The tone was one of Croslandite social democracy and incomes 
policy: 
‘We believe that Britain needs the fresh start of the Alliance even more in 1983 than it did 
in the heady days of our birth in 1981. The Labour Party has not become more moderate. 
The extremists have been taken out of the shop window; they have not been removed from 
the shop. The policies of nationalization, attacks on private enterprise, withdrawal from 
Europe, with its devastating effect upon our exports and investment prospects, and 
alienation of our international friends and allies, are all enthroned and inviolate. Jobs and 
national safety would be at risk. […] By giving a moderate and well-directed stimulus to 
the economy, accompanied by a firm and fair incomes policy, we can change the trend and 
begin to get people back to work. Unlike the Labour Party. We would do it in a way which 
encouraged private business.’129 
                                                          
127 Healey, Denis, pp. 477. 
128 Crewe, Ivor & King, Anthony, pp. 52-58. 
 
129 ‘Working Together for Britain’ (1983): People’s History Museum, Manchester.  
45 
 
This pledged the Social Democratic and Liberal Alliance to resist those policies that the Labour 
Party had in their Manifesto, but also the need for electoral reform to ensure that Labour would 
not be placed in a position of total power, but rather being dependent on the Alliance, which then 
could block the most extreme policies.  
5.3 THE PARTY LEADERSHIP 
 
How could the Party Leadership respond to this division? How does one manage a party that is 
suffering a devastating schism? The difficulty of Michael Foot’s position is difficult to 
exaggerate, and historians have interpreted much of the turmoil as a failure of leadership, 
potentially seeking justification for the shift towards the right that followed in the party in the 
coming decades. At this point, we can appreciate the difficulty of his situation, and seek a less 
biased understanding of his tenure. One of the most important questions is whether the election 
of Michael Foot was a victory of the left, as is often claimed. This is best done by identifying his 
position on economic policy, and how he acted on the economic division in the party. How did 
he react to the SDP-split, which many left-wingers welcomed?  
In a lecture to the Royal Institute of Public Administration in November 1982 in Cardiff, he 
reiterated his support for the main aspects of the AES, and spoke at great length on the conflict 
of ideologies between Labour’s commitment to an economy with a social contract at its heart, 
and the monetarism of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative government.130  
The problem, according to Foot, was convincing the public that the AES was still a serious 
alternative to monetarism, and ensuring that the public was relieved of the misconceptions that 
arose during 1970s. This idea was common in the Labour Party at this point, especially with the 
more pragmatic and senior Labour representatives, who believed that the loss in 1979 was due to 
unfortunate circumstances beyond Labour’s control, and that they would be returned to power 
once those circumstances changed, without any major alterations to the economic strategy and 
policy.131 He did however bemoan the lack of ambition and vision in the Labour movement, 
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which now had become content to debate how Keynesian demand management could recapture 
the ground lost during the 1970s and early 1980s. This was regrettable to any supporter of 
Keynesian demand management, since the AES still was a valid and credible strategy in his eyes, 
and the party should discuss how to improve and make new accomplishments. 
How could one improve the highly successful work with the Social Contract with the unions? It 
had achieved, contrary to popular assumption, impressive social progress and made significant 
improvements to growth rates and inflation, at least up until the IMF had to intervene after the 
balance of payments deficit crisis in 1977, after which it still made gradual progress in many 
respects. The Callaghan government had made leaps in social security by increasing pension 
funds, introducing child benefits, extending employment protection, health and safety legislation, 
nationalising aircraft- and shipbuilding, equal pay and minimum wage, as well as introducing sex 
discrimination and equal pay legislation.132 The economy thus had grown faster than the US and 
on par with Germany, but the growth was unsustainable if the IMF eroded the industrial base by 
forcing cuts in public expenditure.   
The government had thus not abandoned or betrayed the unions, such as the left argued, but 
made honest mistakes. The 1977 crisis was one such mistake, but the dominant factor was 
Callaghan’s ‘Cannot spend your way out of a recession’-flirt with monetarism, which was 
disagreeable to Foot: 
‘I have never doubted that it was possible to use Keynesian policies of public spending as 
one means of getting out of a recession and I repudiate any suggestion to the contrary, in 
the name of sanity and four million unemployed.’ 133 
The 1980s needed a modified and adjusted AES. This meant that the Hollandite planning 
agreements ought to be voluntary; a Meadeite public sector borrowing reduction to avoid deficit 
crises; and Croslandite company taxation reduced to encourage employment, but maintaining a 
balance of tax revenues by increasing indirect taxes and reducing subsidies.134 What Labour in 
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government had learnt, however, was that the country only ran successfully by cooperation, and 
that the social contract with the unions was crucial.  
The Deputy Leader Denis Healey, who had served as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Wilson 
and Callaghan, had experienced that in particular during his time in 11 Downing Street, and thus 
were responsible for many of the policies that the left now criticised heavily. Being Chancellor 
was a burden for Healey, who found the work both hard and frustrating, and he struggled to 
come to grasp with the nature of economics during his first years.135 His appearance at the Party 
Conference or in Parliament showed an unconfident Chancellor who struggled and avoided 
conflict or questioning. Healey thus developed a very critical and practical approach to 
economics, which he explained in his autobiography ‘The Time of My Life’. 
The problem with any economic school of thought was that it was nigh on impossible to assess 
and evaluate the accuracy of the economic aggregates at the Chancellor’s disposal.136 Healey had 
sought precise numbers and estimates on which he could make his policy decisions, but as there 
were too many institutions with particular economic interests and no accurate numbers, this was 
impossible. This led Healey to conclude that Keynes’ theory of maintaining full employment 
without inflation, by demand management, was an unreliable approach. It did not take into 
account the impact of social institutions on the policy decision-making, nor did it account for the 
economic stimulus outside of Britain. How could he manage the domestic economy when 
unreliable and unpredictable external pressures would offset his budget predictions? This was 
exactly what had happened in 1977, when lack of accuracy caused the budget deficit that 
restrained Labour’s policies. Nevertheless, it meant that the alternatives were hardly any better. 
The monetarist approach of fine-tuning the money supply was impossible for the same reason, as 
was the total control of Marx. He supported the social contract, but cooled considerably in his 
support when the unions demanded 30% pay rise despite only 20% inflation, which brought a 
balance of payments deficit of £ 3.5 billion. In response, the Jenkinsite temporary statutory 
incomes policy was implemented, with discontent erupting in the trade unions, and a massive 
loss of votes.  
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As it obvious of these views, neither Foot nor Healey were ideologically inclined to assume 
defined leadership over the party’s economic strategy. They did not possess the intellectual 
originality nor comprehensive understanding necessary to try to impose a view on the party. 
They were, however, both experienced politicians who had developed a flare for pragmatism and 
democratic cooperation far beyond the political differences of opinion they held, and were able 
to work together.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to make a note of how both men at this point were engaged in 
leadership positions in the party, and that this greatly affects their projection of economic 
strategy. Foot made his speech during his leadership, Healey held a powerful desire to explain 
his actions as Chancellor, and both found the leadership status quo difficult. Foot was a natural 
rebel, who Healey felt ‘lacked personal authority and political grip to impose his will’.137 Still, as 
Deputy, Healey felt compelled to support and agree with Foot on all issues in public, and in 
particular as he had become subject to a newly established electoral college that could dismiss 
him if public dissonance was evident. However, whereas the two men worked in relative peace 
together, the party at large did not enjoy the same atmosphere.  
This brings us to the question of Michael Foot’s leadership. There is no lack of scholars pointing 
out that divisions and schisms within a party reflect on the leader and the qualities that person 
possesses, and even the most sympathetic scholars such as Morgan point to little more than a 
hesitant and minute effort on Foot’s part to keep the SDP from leaving the party.138 This is 
problematic, because Foot might have been sympathetic to the far left, but as a former liberal and 
party leader, he greatly disagreed with the means by which the left so eagerly sought those ends.  
Furthermore, Foot was wing-clipped by his position as party leader and subject to the NEC.  
Considering how the hard left had pushed through changes in the Labour Party that would hold 
the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Leadership accountable to the NEC, and effectively 
removed power away from the Party Leader and the PLP, it was very little he could accomplish. 
With no power over the party machinery, he could offer little to the social democrats without 
causing conflict in the party. The hard left saw little reason in offering the right of the party any 
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concessions, and nor would could Foot provide it without the left-dominated party democracy 
behind it. Therefore, while he did wish for a united party, he did not possess the tools to keep the 
party together. The question of leadership thus must be relatable to the reality of what he could 
hope to obtain.  
The only option remaining to the party leadership was to fight the cause of the SDP-split so to 
avoid further deflections. Michael Foot had always appreciated the diversity of opinion within 
the party, but found himself compelled to address the concerns of extremism in the party and in 
the media. The Trotskyite organization ‘Militant Tendency’, which called for world revolution 
and infiltration by revolutionaries into the Labour Party, published the most read party 
publications.139 If the Labour Party were to bring back the breakaway social democrats, these 
groups could no longer be associated with the Party. However, in this fight, the same hard left 
attacked Foot and Healey.   
In 1981, Healey found himself challenged by the left wing’s Tony Benn over the deputy 
leadership. Benn argued that he was testing the newly established party democracy, and how the 
electoral college would handle such a situation, but it seemed like an attempted coup by an 
ambitious left-winger who was taking advantage of a new status quo, where the right was 
severely reduced.140 For the right then, it was essential to deny Benn the Deputy Leadership, 
even though Healey found it to be the ‘busiest and least agreeable job’ in his career. The contest 
campaign became another downturn in the party history, and one that gave the party a lasting 
public image of division, militancy and violence, as militant supporters pursued and heckled 
Healey wherever he went, while Benn upheld the process as a healing of the party. In the end, 
Healey won by the slightest of margins on September 27, 1981.141  
In an article in The Observer titled ‘My Kind of Party’, Michael Foot fought back against the 
left, and hoped he could convince the social democrats to rejoin if the commitment to democracy 
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was strengthened in the party.   He denounced the militant strain of the party as the ‘infantile 
disease of leftism’ which ‘[…] raged for some months like measles in Polynesia’.142 
‘An inhuman means remains inhuman even if it is employed for the purpose of assuring 
human felicity. […] It will take a generation to repair the damage, and years more to 
establish what I believe should become a true, unbreakable Socialist objective – to make 
the pace of industrial change one which human beings and their communities can 
tolerate.’143  
Foot was very well aware that this put him at odds with Benn and the left of the party, and the 
hard left no longer considered him one of them. The tension reached its apex in the Bermondsey 
by-election, where the left-wing radical and militant Peter Thatchell ran as the constituency 
candidate for Labour. Some scholars are eager to point out that Thatchell also was a homosexual, 
but that deviates from the conflict with Michael Foot. Even though the campaign quickly became 
a cesspool of homophobic sentiment and sexual innuendo against Thatchell, the SD-Liberal 
Alliance mainly conducted this, and it might indeed have worked against him, but Thatchell did 
not have realistic chance of winning the constituency anyhow. For Michael Foot, the problem lay 
in the young activist’s desire to use parliamentary action against the Conservative government, 
which would violate the democratic process Foot so deeply respected.  
‘And those declarations, let me underline, did not assert the equality and inter-dependence 
of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities as the Labour movement has practised 
them and the people of Britain understand and support them.’144 
He had recently ordered the NEC to rid itself with the Trotskyite ‘Militant Tendency’ 
organisation, and was adamant when he declared to the House of Commons that the Labour 
Party could not endorse that candidate. This was particularly problematic, since the Party Leader 
does not dictate who can stand for the Labour Party, done in actuality by the constituency parties, 
and Foot had to make a humbling U-turn.  
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Certainly, the handling of Thatchell and the Cenotaph-attire did not merit acclaim for the Party 
Leader. But who would assume the leadership if he had not? If Denis Healey was elected leader, 
the SDP split would merely be delayed, for as Andrew Scott Crines points out, with the new 
Electoral College in place, Benn could have challenged Healey for the leadership and won, 
which would merely have delayed the split.145 It could also go some way to explain why Benn 
did not run for the leadership in the first place. If he believed Healey would win, he could gather 
his supporters for a leadership contest the following year, and explains his compensation-run for 
the Deputy Leadership. In other words, neither of these potential candidates would have had a 
unifying effect on the party. Michael Foot was, in the end, the only unifying candidate, which 
demonstrates the left’s influence in the party.   
Despite this, as shown above, it is thus evident that while Michael Foot did support the AES, 
his leadership was not the shift to the left. His commitment to democracy and opposition to 
authoritarianism kept him away from the hard left, and his efforts to unify the party was 
thwarted by a hard left that did not seek compromise and unification.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
This polarisation between the left and the right of the party is the foundation for the title of this 
thesis, ‘Revolution or Reform’, which seems a fitting title to describe the gap between left and 
right in the 1970s and 1980s debate on economic policy. Michael Foot seemed to be perfectly 
aware of this difficult predicament in his party, and quoted the prophetic works of Tawny once 
more: 
‘Exponents of our brand of Socialism must face the fact that, if the public, and particularly 
the working-class public, is confronted with the choice between capitalist democracy, with 
all its nauseous insincerities, and undemocratic socialism, it will choose the former all the 
time.’146   
Indeed, his words rang true, and the Labour party experienced the worst election in Labour 
history after WWII.  
The thesis does two things to answer the initial problem of why the Labour party failed in 
agreeing a common economic platform ahead of the 1983 election. The study is both an analysis 
of the key intellectual debates in the party in the 1970s and 1980s, and how that debate 
influenced the party’s most prominent politicians in opposition.  
The first part of the thesis shows that the Labour Party possessed a range of revisionist economic 
ideas, and the second part of the thesis explores why they were unable to form an agreement with 
those ideas. Based on this study studies, the following conclusion can be presented:  
Labour in the 1970s and 1980s faced multiple crises that shaped their political influence, some of 
which were created by themselves and some they held little control of. Firstly, the economic 
crises of the Wilson and Callaghan administrations put great stress on the Labour Party and their 
ability to manage the economy on Keynesian principles of demand management, full 
employment and the trade-off of inflation. This caused the dominant revisionist liberal socialist 
and social democratic coalition within in the party to disintegrate, and the hard-left was able to 
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assume prominence. This was mainly due to the lack of credibility in the right’s economic 
strategy, and the left’s ability to produce a strategy unburdened with the realities of governance, 
and benefit from increasing public disenchantment with the Labour Party to gain power in the 
party machinery. This ideological crisis between the left and right was however not down to a 
lack of ideas and proposals for revising the post-war Keynesian demand management. Indeed, 
quite a few of which could have kept a Keynesian economy working, and would not have 
necessitated neither the far left policies of Holland nor the creeping neo-liberalism of the SDP, 
which is what Labour embraced later on under Tony Blair. 
Despite this potential consensus, the left pushed for increasing control of the party, and was able 
to achieve success in 1980 and 1981. This brought about a leadership crisis in the party, where 
the party organization was at odds with the Parliamentary Labour Party, and divisions increased. 
By challenging the social democrats for dominance, they effectively mobilized them in a 
counter-defensive, and adamant resistance from the PLP countered the drive of the left to 
transform party policy. The establishment of the Social Democratic Party was one such response 
to the perceived militant extremism in the left, and weakened the entire Labour Party. The 
remainder of the social democrats inside of the Labour Party remained within the party because 
of the prospect of regaining control over the NEC, and because the SDP was unlikely to succeed 
without electoral reform. However, strong leaders such as Jenkins and Benn contributed actively 
to illuminate the seemingly impossible divide on economic policy.  
To promote a credible and united economic policy, the party needed decisive leadership. The 
leadership of Michael Foot was complex and difficult to assess, but hardly as negative as some 
scholars have claimed. The lack of ideological and economic gravity in the leadership 
contributed to the flux and lack of leadership, but there were no other possible candidate that 
could effectively lead the party, and the SDP-split was likely to have occurred regardless of who 
became leader. Combined with the lack of mandate from the Labour Party after the 1981 reforms 
placed power in the NEC, his relative ability to influence the party was marginal. Despite this, 
his effort to rid the party of the links with extremism and militancy shows a dedication to the 
party unity and the democratic process deserving of a mention, although it must be noted that 
success in these pursuits was limited. It was in this process that his leadership qualities came 
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under greatest scrutiny, and despite few concrete evidence of poor leadership, it is inevitable that 
it coloured the legacy of Foot.  
This eventually culminated in the electoral crisis of 1983, where the extent of the Labour Party’s 
infighting became evident. The infighting produced a poorly organized and chaotic campaign, 
and the party suffered a devastating defeat, barely becoming the second largest party, and 
gaining less than 40% of the vote. The petty infighting had secured the Conservatives a second 
term in office, quite to contrary of what anybody in the party sought to achieve. The catalyst for 
change and unity in the party came in election defeat, rather than in leadership, and the party 
began its right-wing reformation under the new leadership of Neil Kinnock, Michael Foot’s 
successor. 
To conclude, the reason Labour was incapable of delivering a credible economic strategy in 1983 
must be attributed to the polarisation between the extremities in the party, and the change in 
status quo brought about by the failures of the Wilson and Callaghan cabinets. Organisations 
such as Militant Tendency or people such as Benn, Meacher, Hodgson or Thatchell embodied 
this polarisation, but their increasing hold on the party machinery and the NEC prompted a 
significant rebuttal from the social democratic wing that eventually disintegrated the hard left of 
the party. Both sides were increasingly combative and tore the party in two directions, while 
being disinclined towards any form of unifying concessions or even a concerted effort to fight 
against the Conservatives. Tawney’s observation thus rang very clear: 
‘British socialists frequently conduct themselves as though the most certain method of 
persuading the public to fell complete confidence in their cause were to convince it that 
they feel no confidence in each other.’147 
Despite this narrow outlook of this thesis, I maintain that the conclusions reached are sound and 
representative of the parts of the party that this thesis has worked with, and although they only go 
so far in explaining the complexity of the debate, give a reasonable impression of the core 
arguments of the parties involved.  Those people most central to the Labour movement and the 
debate in the 1970s and 1980s are represented. Yet, there are dozens, if not hundreds, of 
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interesting people who contributed in the media, parliament, or party papers where they offered 
variations on the problems that the select personalities above did. Just as these people harboured 
individual and personal political identities, so they possessed a view on the economic policy of 
the party. It would thus be interesting to use this thesis as the first step in an even broader and 
more comprehensive study to evaluate how European policy divided opinion, or how the 
personalities of the politicians hindered cooperation. When discussing economic policy, one can 
potentially include the whole range of political responsibilities. As Williams pointed out in her 
criticism of the revolutionaries: any debate on the economic strategy of the party is intrinsically 
and inseparably connected to the democracy itself.  
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